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Abstract
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous expectation exchange
rate model is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists and fundamentalist regimes. In the
period investigated, chartist dominates in determining the exchange rate. While BI foreign exchange
intervention can effectively push the market exchange-rate to its long-run fundamental equilibrium,
however, Bank Indonesia’s effort to exert a stabilizing effect of foreign exchange interventions, the result
does not show a success.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According with the postulate impossible trinity, freely floating exchange rate will be
adapted by a country which adapts freely foreign exchange system and independent monetary
policy. Indonesia is one of country that adapts it. By freely floating exchange rate and position
as a small open economy, Indonesia’s exchange rate movement is strongly influenced by capital
flows moreover in the short run. In foreign exchange market, capital flows is a reaction of foreignexchange players to buy or sell foreign exchange. Foreign-exchange player can be categorized
in two groups. First group called fundamentalists, buy or sell foreign exchange based on their
expectation of future exchange rate with regard to fundamental economic condition. The
other group called chartist, buy or sell foreign exchange based on their expectation on future
exchange rate with regard to previous exchange-rate behavior. These two groups determine
market exchange-rate as reflected by interaction of supply and demand of foreign exchange.
Sometimes, the exchange rate moves beyond their fundamental value. Hence, existence of
central bank’s. Foreign-exchange intervention policy is needed to drive the exchange rate back
to its long-run fundamental value. The main results in the empirical literature (Almekinders and
Sylvester, 1996; Frenkel, 2004; Ito and Yabu, 2007; and in papers of surveys Neely and Weller,
2001) suggest that foreign-exchange intervention policy tend to be conducted in order to reduce
exchange rate misalignment or to reduce foreign exchange undesired fluctuations.
Foreign-exchange interventions by the central bank could be categorized in two parts.
Firstly, a foreign-exchange intervention (non-sterilized) occurs when a monetary authority buys
(sells) foreign exchange which affect the monetary base, interest rates, market expectations
and intimately the exchange rate. Secondly, foreign-exchange intervention is said sterilized if
the monetary authority offsets or sterilizes the effect of the foreign exchange operation on
the monetary base by selling or buying domestic bonds in order to keep the monetary policy
unchanged.
With the central bank policy, the exchange rates would hopefully stay in the desired level
and its stability can be ensured. Nevertheless, beside relying on central bank policy to stabilize
the exchange rate, financial agents are sometimes actively hedging the exchange rate in order to
avoid losses due to exchange rate fluctuations. Röthig, Semmler, and Flaschel (2005) argued that
the negative effect of exchange rate on the balance sheet can be eliminated by risk management
like hedging. Hedging generally conducts by forward transactions, swaps, NDF etc.
In this part of paper, the behavior of microstructure of foreign exchange market players
(fundamentalists and chartists) in determining exchange rate is investigated. This approach is
hopefully able to overcome the failure of numerous empirical studies based on the asset market
approach of exchange rate to explain short term movements of exchange rate (Lewis, 1995
and Taylor, 1995. This paper adopts the exchange-rate microstructure approach called ‘noise
trading’ channel pioneered by Hung (1997) and the coordination channel Reitz and Taylor
(2008), and Taylor (2004), (2005). Ahrens and Reitz (2003) perform empirical study regarding
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
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to this issue and their result provide evidence that the heterogeneous expectations exchange
rate model is able to explain daily German-US forward rates. Further research by Maatoug,
Fatnassi, Omri (2010) finds that both regimes (fundamentalists and chartists) are persistent in
Australia. However he finds that the fundamentalists regime is riskier and when the RBA was
not active in the foreign exchange, the fundamentalists were disappeared. Other study using
marcov switching approach by Brunetti, Mariano, Scotti (2007) in Southeast Asia, finds that
real effective exchange rates, money supply, stock index returns, are important variables to
identify turbulence and ordinary periods.
To investigate different forecasting strategies by the players, the impact of central bank
intervention is investigated applying a heterogeneous expectations exchange rate model. The
approach is also evaluated by including central bank intervention policy to drive exchange
rate to its long-run fundamental value. Foreign-exchange interventions would allow foreignexchange intervention to influence the both forecasting rules of chartists and fundamentalists,
thereby altering the proportion of the two groups in the foreign exchange market. A central
bank intervening in the foreign exchange market is considered effective if the exchange rate is
driving closer to its fundamental value. Generally, foreign-exchange intervention may as well
improve the performance of expectations based on fundamentals, especially when central
banks try to correct current exchange rate misalignments. Following Frankel and Froot (1986)
the excess demand/supply for foreign currency is assumed to be a function of the relative
success of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques. At the end, it is suggested that
the performance of chartist or fundamentalist exchange-rate expectation is expected to be
improved by central bank intervention.
This research furthermore re-examines the effects of foreign-exchange intervention on
exchange rate volatility within the heterogeneous groups in the foreign exchange market. These
studies suggested two new channels through which sterilized intervention may be transmitted:
the noise trading channel (Hung, 1997) assuming two hypotheses: noise traders will determine
exchange rate by flow market equilibrium and the central bank should intervene in highly volatile
market periods and keep its interventions secret (Reitz, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the theory and
literature study, followed by Research Methodology in section3. Our main empirical results
concerning intervention effectiveness are reported in section 4, before the final section (5)
concludes.

II. THEORY
2.1. Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure
In macro perspective, foreign exchange level should reflect the fundamental economy
condition. As described so far, the determinants of the exchange rate like inflation, productivity,
interest rate, etc categorized as fundamental factors which significantly affect long-run exchangePublished by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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rate. Furthermore, news related to the fundamental factors such as statistic announcements of
money supplies, trade balances, or fiscal policies is received by the market, and the exchange
rates will also change to reflect this news. However, there is also significant issue regarding
foreign-exchange microstructure which also determine exchange rates. Understanding the
“market microstructure” allows us to explain the evolution of the foreign exchange rate, in
which foreign exchange traders adjust their foreign-exchange purchase or sale based on their
own rules. In addition to macroeconomic indicators news, there also exists private information
from which some traders know more than others about the current state of the market.
As illustrated in Figure 1, exchange rate is determined by two groups according to different
approaches of expectations; the fundamental analysis and the chartist analysis. The classification
was proposed previously by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990), and has been enhanced among
others by Ahrens and Reitz (2003), Reitz (2002), Westerhoff (2003), Wieland and Westerhoff
(2005). In this diagram, the market exchange-rate is built by combining fundamentalists and
chartists exchange-rate expectation adjusted by their own proportion in the foreign-exchange
market. In the period of misaligned exchange-rate from desired value, central bank will enter
the market to re-adjust the exchange rate to its desired level or mitigate the short-term
fluctuations.
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Diagram 1.
Fundamentalist-Chartist FX Expectation Mechanism

2.2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies
Global financial market has been pushing emerging countries financial market also more
integrated to the global financial market. As return of assets offered is often higher than ones
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
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in advanced financial market, the asset return including exchange rate is moving with more
fluctuates. This condition is not accepted by most central banks as it will ignite more uncertainty
in their financial market. There are some reasons behind that such as, first, large movements
in the real exchange rate away from medium-run equilibrium are costly, and second, there is
imperfect capital mobility/asset substitutability. To overcome this phenomenon, most central
banks in emerging market economies implement various monetary policies. The most popular
ones are sterilized intervention and short-term policy rate. This opens up the fortuitous possibility
that policy makers may be operating in a two-target, two-instrument world. In this note, this
research re-examines the case for using two policy instruments (the policy interest rate and FX
market intervention) under an IT regime in Indonesia’s financial market. Hence, a central bank
indeed implements two instruments (the policy interest rate and FX intervention).
Lesson learned from previous financial crises, push central banks to maintain stable
consumer prices if they are to achieve sustained and stable growth. Therefore, the central banks
need more policies than just the policy interest rate such as foreign-exchange interventions.
Lesson learned from previous financial crises, central banks should maintain stable consumer
prices as well as promote sustainable growth in order to avoid the financial crises. Therefore,
the central banks need more policies than just the policy interest rate such as foreign-exchange
interventions. One more important think is the central bank should also maintain financial
sector stability including stable exchange-rate and healthy domestic financial institutions in
micro perspective. Regarding to exchange rate, the central bank should avoid possible large
deviations of the exchange rate from its medium-run equilibrium, even in an inflation target
which requires floating exchange-rate system. The undesired exchange rate fluctuations might
be response shortly by foreign-exchange intervention, if it moves persistently. Response to
such changes can deliver better economic outcomes under ITF which requires free-floating
exchange-rate system (but in some reason, a measured foreign-exchange intervention to drive
the exchange rate in line with desired inflation, cannot be neglected) than being neglect of
the exchange rate (Stone, Roger, Shimizu, Nordstrom, Kisinbay, Restrepo, 2009). Furthermore,
in some cases, the exchange-rate moves very volatile persistently then it should be minimized
with additional monetary policies beyond exchange-rate intervention. In this regard, interest
rate policy may be powerful to support exchange rate stability as well as price stability in order
to achieve sustainable economic growth.

2.3. The Foreign Exchange Market and Purposes of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Volatility in foreign exchange rates can disrupt domestic economy through deteriorating
imports and exports performance, decreasing cross-border investment and funding, and
threaten the stability of domestic prices through changes in prices for imported or exported
goods (passed-through power of exchange rate to inflation). As a result, this could affect the
domestic economy and even the economies of trading partners abroad. Therefore, the monetary

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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authority even with ITF should manage the exchange rate to support the achievement of domestic
price stability and domestic economy by applying monetary policies such as foreign exchange
intervention. While many central banks objectives are to set the optimal level of foreign-exchange
that support price stability achievement as well as to mitigate exchange-rate volatility, however,
others prefer to limit exchange rate volatility rather than to meet a specific target for the level
of the exchange rate. Beyond on that, most central banks admit that domestic interest is still
the main reason why they enter the foreign-exchange market in a sustained basis. For example
as summarized in BIS publication (2006), major emerging central banks in Asia perform selling
intervention to halt the continuing their currency appreciation between the end of 2001 and
the end of 2004. As a consequence, global foreign exchange reserves grew by over US$1600
billion, reflecting reserve accumulation by emerging market economies. This phenomenon
shows the emerging central banks was actively enter the foreign exchange market to avoid
their undesired appreciation of their currencies as it would harm their export competitiveness/
domestic economy.
On the other hand, some central banks have different views on exchange rate. They
conversely prefer to stay behind from the foreign exchange intervention such as few developed
countries have actively intervened within the last decade. There are some reasons behind
that decision. One of them suggests foreign exchange intervention policy is not good for
the economy where unbalances exist. Letting the exchange rate fluctuate freely is a sign of
economic rebalancing is working. In this case, the dynamics of the exchange rate is a functioned
as automatic stabilizer for the economy. This argument is elaborated in the studies by Calvo
and Reinhart (2000) which concludes the foreign exchange intervention is a kind of fear of
floating phenomenon. BIS (2006) summarizes reasons why developed countries no longer
actively intervene foreign-exchange market. BIS suggest that the instrument is only effective if
regarded as additional policy interest rate. Another reason implied that large-scale intervention
can undermine the stance of monetary policy independence. The last reason is that private
financial markets have enough capacity to absorb and manage shocks - so let the market
determine the exchange rate.
There are many economists are interested to see the effectiveness of exchange rate
intervention which conducted by central bank due to stabilize the exchange rate. However,
there are also the differences about the view of exchange rate intervention affectivity to stabilize
the exchange rate. Taylor (2004) examines the effectiveness of exchange rate intervention
by using Markov switching model applied to dollar-mark data for the period 1985-98. In his
conclusion, Taylor shows that the intervention increase the probability of stability when the
rate is misaligned, and that its influence grows with the degree of misalignment. However,
intervention within a small neighborhood of equilibrium will result in a greater probability of
instability. Beine, Grauwe, and Grimaldi (2009) investigated the effect of sterilized intervention
in a noise trading channel with two states Markov switching model. Using biweekly data, they
found that interventions increase the weight of fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
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and therefore exert stabilizing influence on the exchange rate. The fundamentalist behavior
tends to stabilize the market while the presence of chartists may cause destabilization. Other
study by Dominguez (1998) explored the effect of foreign exchange intervention by the G-3
central banks (US, German, and Japanese) on the behavior of exchange rates over the 19771994 period. The results indicate that intervention operations generally increase exchange rate
volatility.

2.4. Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure and Foreign Exchange Intervention
Within microstructure approach, exchange-rate behavior is investigated. As discussed
previously, the microstructure approach of exchange rate studies suggested two new channels
through which sterilized intervention may be transmitted. In this regards, foreign-exchange
intervention influence the expectations of foreign-exchange traders which are defined as
fundamentalist and chartists. In this case, Frankel and Froot (1988) developed a model
incorporate both players which is used to forecast the exchange rate expectations by them.
The fundamentalist approach forecasts exchange rate expectation by the fundamentalists
based upon economic fundamentals, whereas the chartist approach forecasts exchange-rate
expectation by chartists based upon the past behavior of the exchange rate. Furthermore, this
model is developed by Vigfusson (1996) by implementing the Markov regime-switching model, in
which explains the Chartist and Fundamentalists (C&F). He also suggests that using MA chartist
model appears to do much better the AR chartist model. In this approach there are two rules in
which two forecasting equations of both chartist and fundamentalist set up to estimate foreign
exchange expectations. In each equation, C&F model placed the time-varying weight.
The further research from Reitz (2002) is about the usage of C&F model to analyze
the exchange rate behavior by the market players and also investigate the impact of foreign
exchange intervention by central bank to the exchange rate expectations by the traders.
Reitz propose a generalization of the noise trader transmission mechanism to examine the
impact of central bank intervention on exchange rates. Within a heterogeneous expectations
exchange rate model intervention operations are supposed to provide support to either chartist
or fundamentalist forecasts, which forces portfolio managers to adjust their foreign currency
positions. He test the model by applying daily US-dollar/DEM forward rates and intervention
data of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1992 in the model. He
finds that the performance of simple chartist trading rules was strong whenever these central
banks intervened on the foreign exchange market. Instead, the fundamentalists which use the
fundamentalist technique has a worse estimation results.
In Australia, the RBA’s approach to foreign exchange market intervention has evolved
since the float of the Australian dollar in 1983, as the Australian foreign exchange market has
developed and market participants have become better equipped to manage their foreign
exchange risk. Over time, foreign exchange market intervention has become much less frequent
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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and more targeted towards addressing periods of market dysfunction. Obviously since 2008,
the foreign exchange intervention by the RBA has been suspended.

III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. The Chartist-Fundamentalist (C & F) Model Specification
In this part of paper, the market exchange rate of USD/IDR is built through the interaction
of foreign-exchange demand-supply in domestic foreign-exchange market. The foreign-exchange
supply and demand is set up by foreign-exchange market players transactions. In the foreignexchange market, the players can be categorized in two parts i.e. fundamentalist and chartist
who have foreign-exchange expectations based on their own rule. Generally, chartists build their
own foreign-exchange expectations using technical analysis rules to explore paste movements of
exchange rate in the future. Meanwhile, fundamentalists build their exchange-rate expectations
based on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, interest rate, productivity, etc. Each of
expectations are regarded as long-run equilibrium or steady state for each foreign-exchange
players within their own regimes.
The fundamentalist and chartist expects that market exchange rate will converge to its
long-run or steady state rate within a specific period depending on the current deviation between
market exchange-rate and the respected steady state value. In this research, basic model is
adopted from Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010: 30-34) and Reitz (2002: 3-7). The exchange rate
is built by interactions between foreign exchange market traders which is divided into 2 groups
i.e fundamentalist and chartists. Fundamentalists forecasting rules and Chartists forecasting rules
can be expressed, respectively, as follow: This paper applies the markov-switching approach on
exchange rate expectation by fundamentalists and chartists in Indonesia as suggested by Reitz
(2002). This paper will also augment the basic model with some contemporaneous variables
beside exchange-rate return and exchange-rate intervention with other variables such as NDF
return and CDS. These such augmented variables are used as they may have significant impact
on exchange-rate behavior.
Within this specification as also suggested by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38),
the exchange-rate St is driven by the decisions of foreign-exchange players (chartist and
fundamentalist) to buy or sell foreign currency based on their expectation of future exchangerate changes and augment by a set of contemporaneous variables included in a vector zt. Hence,
the model specification is written as:

ݏ௧ ൌ Dܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ  Eݖ௧

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
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where the vector of elasticities of the contemporaneous variables (β) and the elasticity of
exchange rate expectation (α) should be constant overtime.
As proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38), the market exchange rate return will
be generated by the two players’ exchange rate expectations or a mixture of chartist ܧ௧ ቂൣݎ௧ ାଵ ൧ቃ
and fundamentalistt୲ ቂൣ୲ ାଵ ൧ቃ forecasts:
ୡ ሿ
୲ ቂൣ୲ ାଵ ൧ቃ ൌ )୲ ୲ ൣ୲ ାଵ ൧  ሺͳ െ )୲ ሻ୲ ሾ୲ାଵ

(2)

The parameter Ft, denoting the weight given to fundamentalist views at date t, this
expectation is dynamically updated by the fundamentalist in a rational Bayesian manner:

ȟ)୲ ൌ ߜሺ)୲ ିכଵ െ )୲ିଵ ሻ

(3)

With :

)୲ ିכଵ ൌ 

 ିா ሺ ሻ

 ሾ ሿ
ாషభ ሾ ሿିாషభ


(4)

Where Ft* is estimated weight given to group of fundamentalist when expecting future
exchange rate. Meanwhile, the value of δ reflects the extent to which portfolio managers
enclose new information from central bank intervention using adaptive process. Since portfolio
managers always maintain a positive weight for both chartist and fundamentalist forecasts, ∆F
has to be restricted so that F stays in the range between 0 and 1 reflected the portion of each
group (fundamentalist and chartist) when determining exchange rate. Meanwhile, to optimize
the weight assigned to fundamentalist, Lewis (1989: 79-100) assume fundamentalist forecasts
exchange rate by means of a Bayesian learning process as follow:

)௧ ൌ



)౪ షభ Ǥ) ሺ ȁாషభ ሾ ሿሻ


 ሾ ሿሻ
ఠషభ Ǥఝ ቀ ቚாషభ ሾ ሿቁାఠషభ Ǥఝ ሺ ȁாషభ




(5)



Where ߮ ሺݎ௧ ȁܧ௧ିଵ ሾݎ௧ ሿሻ and ߮ ൫ݎ௧ หܧ௧ିଵ ሾݎ௧ ሿ൯ሻ is density function of foreign-exchange
return rt of chartist and fundamentalist, respectively. With regard to fundamentalist view, the
market exchange-rate is assumed to revert to long-run fundamental equilibrium ݏ௧ , within a
given speed θ over time depending on the current gap between current exchange-rate st and
long-run fundamental exchange rate, i.e.:


ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ ൌ ߠሺݏ௧ െ ݏ௧ ሻ

(6)

Meanwhile, regarding to chartist view, the market exchange-rate is assumed to revert
to long-run chartist equilibrium ݏ௧ , within a given speed y over time depending on the current
gap between current exchange-rate st and long-run chartist exchange rate ݏ௧ , i.e.:
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2015
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ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ ൌ \ሺݏ௧ െ ݏ௧ ሻ

(7)

In this model, the market exchange rate is built by interactions between fundamentalist
and chartists in foreign-exchange market. Each group of players believe that market exchange
rate will equate to their own expectation in a specific period of time which is denoted by q
(a speed of adjustment of the market exchange-rate for fundamental rule) and y (a speed
of adjustment of the market exchange-rate forchartist rule). Meanwhile, ݏ௧ is the long-run
fundamental (chartist) exchange rate which is built based on economic indicator (previous)
data behaviour by fundamentalist (chartist). According to fundamentalist, foreign-exchange
expectation by the exchange-rate traders can be moved as distributed symmetrically around
its fundamental value ݏ௧ . Although several researchers implement PPP as proxy of exchangerate fundamental value, this paper employs uncovered interest parity (UIP) as the long-run
fundamental value ݏ௧ . The model above explains that market exchange-rate will converge to
its fundamental value ݏ௧ in the long run. A study using PPP by Takagi (1991) provides evidence
there is a valid relationship between market exchange-rate and fundamental exchange rate only
in the long run implying low values for θ. This view is also supported by Taylor and Peel (2000)
and Taylor (2001) showing that due to its nonlinear dynamics the exchange rate reverts to the
PPP level, but only in the long run. Furthermore, PPP or UIP as a measure of the fundamental
exchange rate et seems to be suitable for the investigation of central bank intervention, because
monetary authorities have used it as a target level (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993).
As defined by Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010) this study specify two states of unobserved
latent variables (fundamentalist and chartists regimes) to be incorporated in the model denoted
by variable lt (lt = c for chartist regime lt = f for fundamentalists one). The state of regimes is
parameterized as a first order Markov process and is driven by first-order transition probabilities
which expressed as follow:

 ൌ ܾݎሺ݈௧ ൌ ݂ȁ݈௧ିଵ ൌ ݂ሻ

(8)

 ݍൌ ܾݎሺ݈௧ ൌ ܿሃ݈௧ିଵ ൌ ܿሻ

(9)

The transition probabilities between regimes (fundamentalist-chartist) are assumed to be
constant over time. Fundamentalist transition probabilities (p) is the probability of exchange rate
expectations will remain in the fundamentalist regime, and chartist exchange-rate expectation
transition probabilities (q) for the chartist stay in the chartist regime which are described as
follow:

 ൌ ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ݁ݔሺߨ ሻሻିଵ

(10)

 ݍൌ ͳ െ ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ݁ݔሺߢ ሻሻିଵ

(11)
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If market exchange rate does not converge to its fundamental value in the long run,
central banks will enter the foreign exchange market. The efforts of the central banks on foreign
exchange markets can be called effective, if the adjustment of the current exchange rate to its
long run fundamental equilibrium is accelerated.

3.2. The Foreign Exchange Intervention/Monetary Policy
Augmented Regime-Switching-C&F Model: RS-CF-Int-NDF-CDS
Reitz (2002) outlined exchange-rate expectation modeled using Markov switching
approach both in the conditional mean and variance for both fundamentalists and chartists.
Inspired by the model this paper defines the mean equation of the first regime represent the
fundamentalist regime including the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value
et describe by Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) as outlined above. UIP is chosen because it reflects
the monetary policy instrument to achieve desired domestic price as well as to support sustainable
economic growth. The mean specification model for fundamentalist is defined as follow:

ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ ൌ ߠሺܷܲܫ௧ିଵ െ ݁௧ିଵ )

(12)

This paper expands the original model by augmenting Foreign Exchange Intervention (I),
Non-Delivery Forward (NDF) USD/IDR, and Credit Default Swap (CDS) rate variable to see the
impact of foreign exchange intervention by the central bank, NDF and CDS to foreign exchange
rate expectation by the market players (fundamentalists and chartists). In introducing foreign
exchange intervention/monetary policy operations into the regime-switching framework, this
research defines that the dummy variable It = 1, if the central bank intervenes (by foreign
exchange intervention/monetary policy) at time t and It = 0, otherwise and rewrite the mean
equations of the standard C&F model as follow:

ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ  ൌ  ]௧ ሺܷܲܫ௧ Ȃ݁௧ିଵ ሻ

(13)

for fundamentalist augmented rule model, where
where

(14)

This implies that the observed reversion of the exchange rate to PPP or UIP – denoted
by ζt - is driven by fundamentalist speculation, central bank intervention, NDF rate and CDS
rate. Denoting the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by δθ, NDF by αθ
and CDS by , this research can formulate ζt as a function of a 0,1- exchange rate intervention
dummy, NDFt and CDSt
Meanwhile, Reitz (2002) defines the second regime’s mean equation contains chartist
expectation. Chartists are foreign-exchange player who believe that current exchange rate will
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move to its long-run average value measured by technical trading rules concerning previous
exchange-rate behavior i.e. the moving average trading consisting of the differences between
ma3 and ma200. Meaning that chartists are supposed to expect that a future exchange rate
moves are predicted by the proportion ψ of the positive difference between the 3 day moving
average (ma3) and 200 day moving average (ma200) and vice versa, in this case. Hence, chartist
exchange rate expectation is defined as:

ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ ൌ ߰ሺ݉ܽଶǡ௧ െ  ݉ܽଷǡ௧ ሻ

(15)

The variance of ∆ et, i.e. the volatility of et is assumed to be constant within regimes, h0t
=
and h1t =
thus the source of conditional heteroscedasticity is the regime switching
behavior.
Generally, a central bank will conduct foreign-exchange interventions implementing a
leaning against the wind-strategy to change the traders foreign-exchange expectation back to
chartist long-run exchange rate average value of ma200,t. In this type of study, subsequent changes
in noise trader’s positions magnify the initial impact of intervention operations, augmented
by other significant variables such as NDF and CDS. Hence, the model specification can be
rewritten as follows:

ܧ௧ ሾݎ௧ାଵ ሿ  ൌ  K௧ ሺ݉ܽଶǡ௧ െ  ݉ܽଷǡ௧ ሻ,

(16)

This implies that a given trend in the exchange rate (ηt) is due to chartist speculation,
central bank intervention, augmented by other variables such as NDF and CDS rate. Denoting
the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by δψ, NDF by αψ and CDS by
wy this research can formulate ηt as a0,1-intervention dummy It, NDFt and CDSt as follows:
where

(17)

Clearly, if the foreign exchange intervention of the central bank had an impact on the
forecasting performance of chartists and fundamentalists, a change of coefficients represented
by significant estimates of the various δI should be observed. By introducing intervention
dummies, NDF rate, and CDS rate in the specification of second moment, the conditional
variance becomes:

݄௧ ൌ ߪிଶ   ߜఙಷమ Ǥ ܫ௧   ߜఙಷమ Ǥ ܰܨܦ௧    ߜఙಷమ Ǥ ܵܦܥ௧

(18)

for the fundamental regime, and

݄ଵ௧ ൌ ߪଶ   ߜఙమ Ǥ ܫ௧ ߜఙమ Ǥ ܰܨܦ௧  ߜఙమ Ǥ ܵܦܥ௧
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v17i2

(19)

12

Syarifuddin et al.: FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPECTATIONS IN INDONESIA: REGIME SWITCHING CHAR
Foreign Exchange Expectations in Indonesia: Regime Switching Chartists & Fundamentalists Approach

209

for the chartist regime. Thus, this paper is able to re-examine the relationship between
central bank intervention, NDF, CDS and exchange rate volatility.

IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Data
The data are daily for the sample period 2006 – 2012. All variables are in logarithms except
for the interest rate variables, which are in annual terms. The foreign variable is US Federal
Funds Rate. The Indonesian variables are domestic o/n interbank interest rate, the underlying
consumer price index, NDF USD/IDR Rate, CDS rate, the USD/IDR spot exchange rate, and foreignexchange intervention by BI. The microstructure of foreign exchange in Indonesia is still limited
as few traders exist in foreign exchange market. Even though there are 72 foreign exchange
banks in Indonesia, only about 22 to 38 banks actively trade in the foreign exchange market.
However, Bank Indonesia state that the microstructure of the domestic foreign exchange market
also influences the effectiveness of intervention. The net supplier of foreign exchange is still
dominated by domestic state-owned banks, while foreign banks’ supply or demand depends on
capital inflow/outflow. The volume of transactions tends to be larger during periods of heavy
portfolio inflows. Most foreign-exchange transactions are spot accompanied by swap, although
forward transactions are developing. There are counter-party transaction limits, especially for
smaller banks. Foreign-exchange transactions must have underlying and are limited to domestic
players only (Warjiyo, 2013).

4.2. Evidence of Exchange Rate Expectation & Central bank’s Intervention in
Indonesia
The models described above were estimated by maximum likelihood. Parameter
estimates were obtained using the BFGS algorithm, and the reported t-statistics are based on
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors (White,1982). The estimates are derived from the
daily USD/IDR spot exchange rate series kindly supplied by Bloomberg. The UIP was constructed
using daily O/N Interbank rate of IDR and USD. The intervention dummy series is based
on intervention data kindly provided from Bank Indonesia. The foreign exchange intervention
series only includes active foreign-exchange interventions made by Bank Indonesia to influence
foreign exchange rates. Foreign-exchange intervention by BI is reported whenever they changed
their net foreign assets. The sample extends from January 2006 to June 2012. The series of
the spot exchange rate, the UIP relation and the 200 day moving average are presented in
upper graph, Bank Indonesia purchases and sales of Dollars against IDR can be seen as vertical
graph in Figure 1.
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Source: author’s calculation

Figure 1.
USD/IDR spot rate,UIP, MA 200 and BI FX intervention
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Figure 2. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model”

In the RS-CF-INT model (b), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to last up (1 p) to 9 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer duration of at
least 13.5 trading days. Even it is better that model (a) because of BI exchange rate intervention,
the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share p is about 40% still smaller than the chartist
rule USD/IDR expectation q (60%) in performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates
of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low
volatility: the variance in the second regimes
in these conditional regimes is still lower
than the variance in the first regimes
even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The
estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients ψ and θ, are also statistically significant
and of the correct sign.
-1

Figure 3. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention”

In the RS-CF-INT-NDF model (c), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to last
up (1 - p)-1 to 5.4 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer
duration of at least 9.4 trading days. Because of BI exchange rate intervention and NDF rate
variable, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share p decreases to about 37% which is
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v17i2
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even smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation q (63%) in performing USD/IDR market
rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing
periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second regimes
in these conditional
regimes is still lower than the variance in the first regimes
even though for chartist it gets
smaller variance. The estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients ψ and θ, are also
statistically significant and of the correct sign.

Figure 4. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention & NDF”

In the RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model (d), the regime switching is getting faster than those
in previous models meaning of increasing exchange rate uncertainty, the (first) fundamentalist
regimes are expected to last up (1 - p)-1 to 3.8 trading days where as the (second) chartist
regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer duration of at least 6.8 trading days. Because of BI exchange
rate intervention, augmented with NDF rate, and CDS 1mth variable, the fundamentalist rule
USD/IDR expectation share p decreases to about 36% which is even smaller than the chartist
rule USD/IDR expectation q (64%) in performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates
of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low
in these conditional regimes is still lower
volatility: the variance in the second regimes
than the variance in the first regimes
even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The
estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients ψ and θ, are also statistically significant
and of the correct sign.
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Figure 5. Smoothed Probabilities model augmented with FX Intervention & NDF & CDS”

Figure Smoothed Probabilities of USD/IDR in the basic model (a) no intervention, no
NDF &CDS, (b) augmented with BI intervention, (c) augmented with BI intervention & NDF, (d)
augmented with BI intervention, NDF, and CDS.
However, the most important results from these Markov switching procedures are
significant parameter estimates of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques within
the heterogeneous expectations framework. As has been outlined in the theoretical section
of the paper, central bank interventions are supposed to affect exchange rates by influencing
chartist and fundamentalist forecasting success. Because the standard RS-CF model is nested
in the more general RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model, the hypothesis can be examined by the values
of the log-likelihood functions, the likelihood ratio test (LRT) statistic and the estimates of the
various δs, αs, ωs, in table 1.
As the LRT statistic suggests, the consideration of intervention dummies, NDF, and CDS,
explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood function. Hence, the hypothesis that
exchange rate expectations are not affected by central bank interventions, NDF, and CDS has to
be rejected. Particularly, the results of parameter estimates give rise to the conclusion that foreign
exchange activities of Bank Indonesia, NDF and CDS, could have supported fundamentalist
and chartists rules. The dummy exchange-rate intervention coefficient δθ of the central bank is
significant and reports a significant increase of zt whenever It =1. In the case of addition of new
variable ‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’, respectively the coefficient αθ of the central bank is still significant,
while wθ is insignificant. However, totally the effect, reports a significance increase of zt, meaning
that speed of adjustment to long-run/fundamental value is increasing when fundamentalists
dominated the market and central banks intervene.
When looking at the link between central bank intervention, within chartist exchange rate
expectations model, the (b) model recognizes insignificant decreasing change of ht as δy show
negative value though insignificant. This implies that the adjustment of the exchange rate to
its long run equilibrium has been decelerated in periods when chartists dominated the market
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol17/iss2/3
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v17i2
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and central banks intervene. In the case of addition of new variable ‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’ to the
chartist model as shown in (d) model, the coefficient αψ and ߱ట are surprisingly significant and
reports a significance increase of ht, meaning that speed of adjustment to its long-run value is
increasing because of NDF and CDS (even though dy - decrease the speed of adjustment to its
long run equilibrium in one hand when chartists dominated the foreign exchange market).
Regarding to volatility in relation with central bank’s FX Intervention, this research finds
that this is confirmed by the finding that the FX intervention dummy (especially in fundamentalist
regime) in the model RS_CF_INT, identified periods in which the volatility is a bit increase except
in chartist regime which is not significant, as shown in Table 1. It has also same conclusion
when using model (d), while model (c) reports contradiction. However, the result should be
very careful before quickly concluding that exchange rate volatility increase in fundamental
regime is due to intervention operations. Rising uncertainty of global financial condition which
may ignite sudden and massive capital flows, disorderly markets, speculative transactions
behaviour, may hamper central bank intervention policy. This is confirmed in a study by Baillie
and Osterberg (1997a) that find evidence that foreign-exchange interventions by US, German,
and Japanese central banks have tended to increase foreign-exchange volatility in the USD/JPY
forward market when JPY/USD is under pressure. This is also supported by findings in a study
by Giner and Mendoza (2005) which argues that foreign-exchange intervention appears to
be effective in short time or the effectiveness will be short-lived. He also finds that the more
frequently exchange-rate intervention applied by the central bank, the effectiveness would be
smaller. In the case of Indonesia, the central bank enters the foreign exchange market almost
every day, this might confirm why the volatility is conversely increased. Furthermore, excessive
exchange-rate fluctuations might be found as another factor that halts Bank Indonesia effort
to reach the effectiveness of foreign exchange market in driving exchange rate to its long-run
fundamental or in achieving price stability condition. This phenomenon, making central bank
intervention remains an ambiguous policy tool in influencing exchange rates.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous
expectation exchange-rate model, is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists
and fundamentalist regimes. It is shown that the two regimes are persistent. The estimates of
chartist and fundamentalist coefficients ψ and θ, are statistically significant and of the correct
sign despite showing very low values meaning the market exchange rate will converge to their
own steady-state value in the long run. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in the
exchange rate determination. As the LRT statistic suggest, the consideration of foreign-exchange
intervention dummies explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood function. Hence,
the hypothesis that exchange rate expectations are not affected by central bank interventions
has been rejected. Particularly, the result of parameter estimates give rise to the conclusion that
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foreign exchange activities of BI could have supported fundamentalist (UIP) & chartist (Moving
Average) trading rules but in opposite direction. The dummy BI FX interventions coefficient in
the fundamentalist period δθ is positive whereas in the chartist period δψ is negative; but only
the coefficient of fundamentalist is highly significant in the complete model (d).
When looking at the link between BI FX intervention within both fundamentalist/chartist
exchange rate expectations, this study recognizes very significant change of ζt and ht but
in opposite direction. This implies that the adjustment of the exchange rate to its long run
(fundamental) equilibrium ‘UIP’ has been accelerated in the periods when fundamentalists
dominated the market and central bank intervenes as it improve the performance of
expectations based on fundamentals, especially when central banks try to correct current
exchange rate misalignments. On the other hand, the adjustment of the exchange rate to its
long run (fundamental/chartists equilibrium) has been decelerated in the periods when chartists
dominated the market and central bank intervenes.
In the case of Indonesia, it is shown that the predictive power of fundamentalist forecasting
techniques approximated by the deviation of the current exchange rate from the UIP level, were
enhanced whenever the Bank Indonesia intervened on the foreign exchange market. There is
evidence that within this framework, central bank operations on foreign exchange market has
been called effective, as the adjustment of the exchange rate to its long run (fundamental)
equilibrium is accelerated when fundamentalists dominated the market and central bank
intervenes, not when chartists dominated the market. It means that the impact of central bank
intervention on foreign exchange rates is only effective when assessed by means fundamentalist
regime approaches. In this regards, Bank Indonesia’s foreign-exchange intervention has been
able to drive the USD/IDR to long-run/fundamental ‘UIP’ as assumed in fundamentalist rule.
With regard to exchange-rate volatility, however, Bank Indonesia efforts to exert a
stabilizing effect of foreign exchange interventions, the result still does not show what Bank
Indonesia wants as the variance shows increasing value. Several factors such as external shocks
and disorderly foreign exchange market which beyond Bank Indonesia control, may play
significant role behind this findings.

VI. POLICY IMPLICATION
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous expectation
exchange rate model is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists and fundamentalist
regimes. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in the exchange rate determination.
While BI foreign exchange intervention can push the market rate to its long-run fundamental
equilibrium, however, Bank Indonesia’s effort to exert a stabilizing effect of foreign exchange
interventions, the result does not show a success.
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As a policy implication, the central bank should pay attention more to the foreign-exchange
market player, especially the fundamentalist and chartist as they have a significant role in
determining market exchange rate. The central bank should drive exchange rate expectation to
the fundamentalist’s rule as it is relevant with monetary objective in achieving targeted inflation.
Furthermore, foreign-exchange intervention is proven effective when exchange rate expectation
is dominated by fundamentalist. As consequence, the central bank should implement optimal
monetary policy with appropriate strategy especially in determining optimal interest rate and
exchange rate intervention as well as implement governance aspects of monetary policy.
For a small open economy like Indonesia, exchange rate movement does not always
reflect fundamental value. Increasing USD/IDR exchange rate volatility often occurs as a result
of rising uncertainty of global economic condition which ignites sudden massive capital flows,
irrational behavior of market players, the microstructure conditions of the market, and offshore
market influence.
As a policy implication, relying solely on Bank Indonesia’s interest rate policy to achieve
the inflation target and maintain stability is not always sufficient. The central bank’s strategy is
to include exchange rate policy in the monetary and macro-prudential policy in order to achieve
its goal more effectively.
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